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INTRODUCTION
American administrative theory and law have long treated as an axiom
the notion that agencies are subordinate to the statutes that govern their
mandates, and that statutory interpretation is central to the implementation
of these mandates. Working from this starting point, scholars have diverged
both over the extent to which agency practices should parallel the interpre-
tive methods of courts and the degree of deference to which agency inter-
pretive decisions are entitled. But the essential construction of administra-
tive behavior as an exercise in statutory interpretation has generally been
shared by most administrative law scholars. This understanding has been
called into question recently by at least two authors. In lieu of statutory
construction, Professor Foote posits "operational implementation of statuto-
ry programs" as the core function of agencies' and blames the Chevron de-
cision2 for the entrenchment of an erroneous statutory-interpretation para-
* Thanks to Glen Staszewski for insightful comments, and to Barbara Bean for
extraordinary research support.
1. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How
Chevron Misconceives the Function ofAgencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 673,
674-75 (2007).
2. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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digm.3 Similarly, Professor Pierce has argued that policy making is a more
apt descriptor than statutory interpretation of the process through which
"agencies give meaning to ambiguous provisions in the statutes."' For
Pierce, statutory interpretation properly describes the role of agencies where
Congress spoke directly to an issue and the matter consequently falls under
step I of Chevron.' But interpretation does not properly capture the mean-
ing of agency action in the face of statutory ambiguity.' Taking issue with
Pierce, Professor Mashaw contends that agencies cannot successfully de-
fend their statutes before reviewing courts except in reference to permissible
interpretation of their governing statutes, and that the process by which
agencies set out to implement their statutes is by necessity interpretive.! In
the context of the Mashaw and Pierce debate, the choice of label is relevant
to whether courts and agencies are justified in applying differing standards
to the interpretation of statutes. But the terminological impasse the two hit
in the course of this debate cuts to the very core of administrative law
theory.
To question the fit between statutory interpretation and administration
is to cast doubt on deep-rooted constructions of the meaning of the rule of
law in America. The understanding of agencies as faithful agents of Con-
gress informs the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act. And yet, as attested by many of the papers in this symposium, statuto-
ry interpretation is frequently a poor descriptor of the practice of agencies or
the logic of administrative action. For this reason, our ability to advance the
contemporary debate over agency statutory interpretation would benefit
from greater awareness of the historical process through which we have
come tentatively to settle on this formulation. Towards this end, this paper
offers a highly abbreviated account of the process through which the work
of agencies came to be equated with statutory interpretation under common
law. This history exposes deep-seated divisions over this formulation and
its implications for the status and autonomy of executive authority over the
course of English legal history. Greater awareness of the sources and per-
3. Id.
4. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes they
Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 197, 199 (2007).
5. Id. The Chevron decision applied a two-step process to judicial review of agen-
cy interpretation of statutory provisions. Step one asks whether Congress spoke directly to
the specific issue in question. To the extent that the reviewing court answers the above in the
positive, congressional intent is dispositive and the reviewing court must implement it. If the
court determines, however, that Congress did not speak to the specific issue it moves to the
next step in the analysis. Under step two the question for the court is whether the agency's
interpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
6. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 199.
7. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A
Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 889,
898 (2007).
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sistence of this disagreement can enhance our ability to discern similar un-
dercurrents within the contemporary debate.
England, rather than the United States, must serve as the starting point
for this inquiry because the framing of agency action through the lens of
statutory interpretation is a distinctive feature of the common law world, in
contra distinction from continental civil law. Key to the evolution of this
distinction was the role of Roman-law-based conceptions of prerogative
royal authority in the legitimation of absolutist monarchies in early modern
Europe. For many centuries, English monarchs and their supporters made
claim to prerogative regulatory authority parallel to that of rulers in France
and elsewhere in Europe. Their opponents brought a countervailing legal
ideology geared at limiting the scope of the prerogative under common law
principles. The history of English constitutionalism is one of a struggle
between supporters of the royal prerogative and the expansive regulatory
authority it conferred on the one hand, and those who invoked common law
principles as a constraint on the Crown's authority, on the other. Embedded
within the respective constitutional positions were divergent conceptions of
the role of the state. Those who aligned with the Crown considered the pre-
rogative to be a beneficial instrument for the advancement of the general
welfare and common good.' Detractors viewed prerogative interference
with private rights to be tyrannical measures and the mark of despotism.
The latter construction transformed into a constitutional axiom after the end
of the seventeenth century. Ever since, the Crown's regulatory authority
was subordinated to Parliament, and executive regulation could proceed
only under statutory delegation. By definition, agency action became con-
tingent on statutory interpretation.
Pervasive doubts regarding the desirability of regulatory interventions,
the role of the state, and the legitimacy of continental legal and administra-
tive models were hardly put to rest with the victory of Parliament and the
common lawyers at the end of the 17th century as discussed below. But the
terms of the debate shifted towards the permissible scope of delegation and
the degree of deference to be accorded to an agency's statutory interpreta-
tion. In this fashion, the formula served to disguise unresolved disagree-
ments on whether and when administrators were entitled to make, rather
than strictly interpret law.
I. PARLIAMENT, ORDINARY LAW AND THE RULE OF COMMON LAW
At least since Dicey, comparisons between common law and continen-
tal systems of administrative law have tended to focus on the identity of the
8. ROSCOE PouND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 63 (1921).
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judicial tribunals in charge of reviewing agency decisionmaking.' In fre-
quently quoted language, Dicey contrasted French Droit Administratif with
English "rule of law" principles under which "every man, whatever be his
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable
to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals."o Discussions of this passage
have tended to highlight Dicey's reference to the necessity of review by
ordinary tribunals. But for the purpose of tracing the link between common
law constitutionalism and administrative statutory interpretation, it is Di-
cey's reference to "ordinary law" that is most important. A requirement for
judicial review of administrative decisionmaking does not inherently entail
that agencies justify their decisions through the lens of statutory interpreta-
tion. One can well imagine a hybrid system in which regular courts oversee
the implementation of a distinct set of administrative norms such as those
that specialized courts are entrusted with enforcing under the continental
model. Rather, the overlap between agency statutory interpretation and
judicial review follows from the subordination of administrative behavior to
"ordinary law," a subordination that was for Dicey derivative of the sove-
reignty of the English parliament.
Parliamentary sovereignty is most often construed as a synonym for
unrestricted lawmaking power and attendant legislative immunity from con-
stitutional judicial review. But in addition, as Professor P.P. Craig has ar-
gued, parliamentary sovereignty was understood by some as a requirement
for parliamentary monopoly over lawmaking." Under the latter meaning,
the executive was deprived of any independent lawmaking authority by
virtue of Parliament's exclusive power to legislate. Dicey argued from such
a conception of parliamentary monopoly when he equated the rule of law
with the universal application of the "ordinary law of the realm." 2 And it
was from this starting point that he derived the rationale for judicial review.
Legislative monopoly was compatible with the delegation of implementing
authority to executive bodies such as ministries and agencies. But the ever-
present threat that the executive would exceed the scope of its delegated
authority "demanded an institution to police the boundaries which Parlia-
ment had stipulated."" This was the function that judicial review of admin-
istration was intended to serve. Speaking directly to this issue, Dicey wrote:
"The fact that the most arbitrary powers of the English executive must al-
ways be exercised under Act of Parliament places the government, even
9. A.V. DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 179-91 (London, MacMillan 1885).
10. Id. at 177-78.
11. P.P. CRAIG, PUBLIC LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 19-29 (1990).
12. DICEY, supra note 9, at 178.
13. CRAIG, supra note 11, at 22.
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when armed with the widest authority, under the supervision, so to speak, of
the Courts."l4 The nexus between administrative decisionmaking and statu-
tory interpretation followed as a consequence. Since agencies could not
exceed the jurisdictional boundaries determined under the statute, they were
compelled to justify their decisions in reference to statutory meaning.
Nineteenth-century British judges diverged among themselves regard-
ing the degree of autonomy to be accorded to agencies' readings of their
statutes in a fashion reminiscent of contemporary divisions in American
administrative law." An important group of cases adopted the position that
it was up to agencies to determine the meaning of applicable statutory
terms, whereas other courts took a more interventionist approach.'" Formal-
ly, the disagreement between the two judicial philosophies revolved around
the degree of autonomy that parliament had intended to confer on agencies
through delegation-a framing that did not seem to call into question par-
liament's legislative monopoly as such. The possibility that this framing
masked deeper divisions over the legitimacy of independent executive-
branch lawmaking authority deserves serious consideration in view of the
paramount significance of this question over the course of English constitu-
tional history.
II. ROMAN LAW, COMMON LAW, AND PREROGATIVE AUTHORITY IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND
With the consolidation of territory under single rulers during the late
Middle Ages, European monarchs set out to implement ambitious agendas
of social and economic reforms. In justification of their authority to alter
existing institutions and entitlements, the emergent monarchies invoked a
royal prerogative to "administer, judge and legislate for the common and
public welfare."" At least since the fourteenth century, French and English
kings invoked their prerogative to collect taxes and issue royal ordinances,
letters patents, and other forms of regulation. In both countries, the 16th
and 17th centuries brought marked expansion in the Crown's utilization of
prerogative regulation in pursuit of mercantilist economic policies. The
promulgation of royal legislative enactments (termed "ordinances" in
France and "proclamations" in England) was accompanied by the creation
of specialized prerogative courts with sole jurisdiction over the enforcement
of prerogative regulation.' Through these courts, monarchs sought to insu-
14. DICEY, supra note 9, at 339.
15. CRAIG, supra note 11, at 23-25.
16. Id. at 23-24.
17. GAINES POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT: PUBLIc LAW AND THE
STATE, 1100-1322 20 (1964).
18. E.R. Adair, The Statute ofProclamations, 32 ENG. HIsT. REv. 34,41 (1917).
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late their regulatory activities from review and obstruction by existing regu-
lar courts.
In pursuing this strategy, European rulers relied on Roman law prin-
ciples under which the ruler was said to have acquired, by delegation from
the people, absolutist administrative and legislative authority." The subor-
dination of private rights to the ruler's prerogative followed from the ruler's
obligation to advance the "common utility, good, and safety of all."20 Under
the normal course of events, the king was bound by private law and ex-
pected to respect private rights. But when the safety and welfare of the
realm were put in danger, the ruler's prerogative authority took prece-
dence. 2' Roman law built in this fashion on a distinction between private
law pertaining to the interests of individuals and public law applying to the
interests of the state as such. Justinian's Digest begins with a reference to
this distinction as recounted by Ulpian, and the Corpus Juris Civilis similar-
ly offered textual support for the ruler's authority to promote the public
welfare even at the expense of private rights.22 Justinian's writings were
well familiar throughout Western Europe during the Middle Ages and were
repeatedly invoked as evidence of the legality of absolute executive authori-
ty.23 This was the case not only in continental Europe, but in England as
well. In England, however, Roman-law-based claims to the legitimacy of
the royal prerogative faced a formidable challenge from the common law.
Writing during the later part of the 15th century, Sir John Fortescue
argued for the existence of fundamental constitutional differences between
the authority of English and French rulers. In a book titled De Laudibus
Legum Angliae (Praises of the Laws of England), Fortescue insisted that
English law barred unilateral royal policies of the type exercised by the
French Crown.24 Unlike France, Fortescue wrote, "In the realm of England.
... [The king may not] by himself or by his ministers, impose tallages, sub-
sidies, or any other burdens whatever on his subjects, nor change their laws,
nor make new ones, without the concession or assent of his whole realm
expressed in his parliament."25 Elsewhere, Fortescue explained the cardinal
difference between the authority of English monarchs and that of rulers un-
der civil law through a distinction between royal and political power. Civil
law conferred absolute royal power under the Justinian maxim, "What
19. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS: CHAPTERS IN
EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 74 (1987).
20. POST, supra note 17, at 13.
21. Id. at 20.
22. J.W. F. ALLISON, A CONTINENTAL DISTINCTION IN THE COMMON LAW 1 (1996);
POST, supra note 17, at 19.
23. LEGISLATION AND JUSTICE 340 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 1997).
24. SIR JOHN FORTESQUE, ON THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 52 (Shelley
Lockwood ed., 1997).
2 5. Id.
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please[s] the prince has the force of law."26 But "the king of England is not
able to change the laws of his kingdom at pleasure, for he rules his people
with a government not only royal but also political.""
Fortescue's book attests to the existence of significant disagreement in
early modem England regarding the legitimacy of Roman-law-based con-
ceptions of monarchical regulatory authority. While insisting that English
constitutional principles denied rulers prerogative legislative authority, For-
tescue acknowledged that some English monarchs tried to emulate French
administrative practices and invoked civil law principles so as to change
laws at their pleasure, make new ones, inflict punishments, and impose bur-
dens on their subjects, and also determine suits of parties at their own will
and when they wish.28 By the latter, Fortescue seemingly referred to the
creation of prerogative courts, independent of common law oversight, dur-
ing his time.
The 16th century brought marked expansion in prerogative legislation
and with it growing opposition from both the courts and parliament. In a
number of cases, judges questioned the validity of royal proclamations is-
sued in the absence of statutory authorization.29 These decisions were be-
hind parliament's enactment in 1539 of what has come to be known as Hen-
ry VIII's "Statute of Proclamations.""o The Act required obedience to royal
proclamations "concerning the advancement of his commonwealth and
good quiet of his people."" In justification of the need for royal legislative
authority independent of express parliamentary authorization, the statute
invoked the need for "speedy remedies" necessitated by "sudden causes and
occasions," and by the existence of "regal power" given to the King by God
to "make and set proclamations for the good and politic order and gover-
nance of . .. his realm."32 The King was precluded, however, under the
statute from issuing proclamations made to the prejudice of any person's
life, liberty, or property, or in breach of any laws or customs currently in
force."
In granting explicit authorization for the King to issue proclamations
across broad areas of policy, the statute acknowledged and responded to
judicial concerns regarding the legality of proclamations that were not au-
thorized by parliament and thus, from this perspective, the statute can be
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 48.
29. Sir John Baker, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Renaissance England, 2
Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 3 (2004).
30. Statute of Proclamations, 1539, 27 Hen. 8 c. 26 (Eng), available at http://www.
constitution.org/sech/sech_074.txt.
3 1. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
Spring] 57
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seen as deferential to the courts.34 At the same time, the parliamentary im-
primatur, which the Statute conferred upon prerogative legislation but-
tressed the practice against judicial scrutiny. In this fashion, the Statute of
Proclamations helped avert a political crisis through a pragmatic formula
aimed at reconciling parliamentary supremacy with prerogative authority."
The strategy faced considerable opposition, however, both within and out-
side Parliament, resulting in the repeal of the Proclamations Statute soon
after Edward VI's coronation in 1547. Nevertheless, the Tudor monarchs
continued and expanded their reliance on prerogative legislation throughout
the rest of the 16th century against judicial insistence that "'no proclamation
by itself may make a law which was not law before, but may only confirm
and ratify an old law, and not change it.'" 6 The issue came to a head under
James I, whose frequent recourse to proclamations prompted the House of
Commons to protest the practice by petitioning the King in 1610. James
turned to Edward Coke, who was then Chief Justice of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, with the hope of procuring Coke's support. Coke's response
was that proclamations could not create new offenses and may only aggra-
vate an offense that was already illegal. The issue likewise arose in an
exchange between Coke and the Lord Chancellor on the legality of a pair of
royal proclamations, the first of which prohibited the construction of new
buildings in London and the second the processing of wheat starch.38 The
charge against these proclamations was that they lacked "former precedent
or authority in law."" The Lord Chancellor retorted that "every precedent
hath a commencement."40 His advice to the judges was that they should
"maintain the power and prerogative of the King" whose actions are "ac-
cording to his wisdom, and for the good of his subjects."4 1 Invoking Fortes-
cue, Coke responded that "the King by his proclamation or other ways can-
not change any part of the common law, or statute law, or the customs of the
realm."42 Neither could the King "create any offence by his prohibition or
proclamation which was not an offence before, for that was to change the
law."43 The King could issue proclamations for one purpose only: "to pre-
34. See Baker, supra note 29, at 6.
35. William Huse Dunham, Jr., Regal Power and the Rule of Law: A Tudor Para-
dox, 3 J. OF BRITISH STuDIEs 24, 25 (1964).
36. Baker, supra note 29, at 6 (citing British Library [BL] MS. Add. 24845, fo. 31
(translated)).
37. F. W. Maitland, Sketch of Public Law at the Death of James I, in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 256-58 (Cambridge University Press 1968).
38. Proclamations Case (1611), 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, at 1353 (K.B.).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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vent dangers, which it will be too late to prevent afterwards, he may prohibit
them before, which will aggravate the offence if it be afterwards commit-
ted."" Notably, Coke himself expressed quite a different perspective on this
issue a decade earlier when he wrote in his capacity as attorney general for
Queen Elizabeth "that '[i]f any thing be hurtfull or preiudiciall to the com-
mon wealth or the state, albeit the same be not prohibite by lawe her Majes-
tie may prohibite the same for the good of her people."
Intertwined with conflict over the existence of prerogative lawmaking
authority was the justiciability of matters pertaining to the exercise of pre-
rogative powers before the regular common law courts. As noted earlier,
both in France and England resort to prerogative legislation was accompa-
nied by the granting of exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement to specially
created judicial bodies. In England, the most prominent of these prerogative
courts were the Chancery, the Admiralty courts, the Court of Star Chamber,
and the Court of Requests.46 The justification for granting exclusive juris-
diction over prerogative enactments to prerogative courts was based on the
fundamental Roman law distinction between ordinary and extraordinary
law.47 Writing for the Court of Exchequer in Bate's Case (1606), Baron
Fleming offered the following on why the imposition of customs duties was
not justiciable in ordinary courts:
The Kings power is double, ordinary and absolute, and they have several lawes and
ends. That of the ordinary is for the profit of particular subjects ... and this is ex-
ercised by equitie and justice in ordinary courts, and by the civilians is nominated
jus privatum and with us, common law: and these laws cannot be changed, without
parliament .... The absolute power of the King is not that which is converted or
executed to private use, to the benefit of any particular person, but is only that
which is applied to the general benefit of the people and is salus populi . . . and is
most properly named Pollicy and Government. 48
The following year, Dr. James Cowell, a Professor of Civil Law at Cam-
bridge, spoke to prerogative's independence from the common law courts
when he "defined the royal prerogative as 'that special Power, Preeminence,
or Privilege which the King hath over and above other Persons, and above
the ordinary course of the Common Law."'49
44. Id.
45. Adair, supra note 18, at 45 (quoting Notes by Attorney-General Coke on the
prerogative, State Papers, Dom. Eliz., cclxxvi. 81 (1600?)).
46. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 101-9 (2d ed.
1979).
47. See Francis Oakley, Jacobean Political Theology: The Absolute and Ordinary
Powers of the King, 29 J. HIST. IDEAS 323 (1968).
48. An Information Against Bates, 145 Eng. Rep. 267 (1606), cited in Oakley, supra
note 47, at 324.
49. Oakley, supra note 47, at 325 (quoting DR. COWELL, A LAW DICTRONARY OR
INTERPRETER OF WORDS AND TERMS, USED EITHER IN THE COMMON OR STATUTE LAWS, SV.
"Prerogative" (1727)).
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Cowell was among a small but elite cadre of civil-law-trained lawyers
in England at the beginning of the 17th century.so Civil lawyers and com-
mon lawyers generally aligned with opposite sides in the political divisions
of early 17th-century England. Whereas the civil lawyers sided with the
monarchy and the English Church, the allegiance of most common lawyers
was with the Puritans and the Parliament.s With the latter's victory subse-
quent to the 1688 Revolution, the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement,
the prerogative was severely curtailed and the King was deprived of any
independent legislative authority.52 Henceforth administrative authority was
to be strictly circumscribed in reference to the terms of statutory delegation.
Through this transition, parliamentary statutes became significantly more
detailed than was the practice prior to the revolution when statutes tended to
frame statutory objectives in general terms leaving broad sphere for prerog-
ative implementation." In lieu of conferring general administrative authori-
ty in matters of economic and social policy such as the construction of roads
or the naturalization of aliens, Parliament pursued a case-by-case, highly
localized approach to statutory authorization.54 In the process, administra-
tive practices that were earlier justified as an exercise of prerogative au-
thority were redefined as interpretive of pertinent statutory language.
Centuries of division over the compatibility of Roman-law-based dis-
tinctions (between private and public or ordinary and extraordinary law)
with English constitutionalism seemingly resolved with the common law's
triumph at the end of the 17th century. But the victory was far less com-
plete and final than historical accounts have often construed it to be. And
the desirability of emulating continental, civil-law based administrative
models remained a major bone of contention in Britain of the 18th, 19th,
and early 20th century.
50. Until the middle of the 13th century, most English lawyers received their educa-
tion on the continent. Around that time, however, legal education institutions were estab-
lished in England. In time two alternative tracks developed for entering England's legal
profession. One path required study at Oxford, Cambridge, or one of the universities on the
continent, culminating in the degree of doctor in civil law. The other required apprenticeship
in legal inns, after which students were called to the bar. Graduates of the first track became
known as civilians, and graduates of the second were called common lawyers. The common
lawyers dominated England's legal profession by a large margin. Although there were only
200 civilian lawyers in the period between 1603 and 1641, there were close to 2000 common
lawyers. BRIAN P. LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND 1603-1641: A POLITICAL
STUDY 3 (1973).
51. Id.
52. MARGUERITE A. SIEGHART, GOVERNMENT BY DECREE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE HISTORY OF THE ORDINANCE IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW 58 (Stevens & Sons Ltd.
1950).
53. Maitland, supra note 37, at 605.
54. HENRY PARRIS, CONSTITUTIONAL BUREAUCRACY 161-62 (1969).
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III. EXECUTIVE LAW MAKING IN BRITAIN AT THE TURN OF THE 2 0 TH
CENTURY
In an 1893 treatise on comparative administrative law, Frank Good-
now distinguished between the type of ordinances present under "monar-
chical governments or republics where monarchical traditions are strong"
and those existing in the United States. Under the former, the executive can
issue independent and supplemental regulation geared at the creation of law
where there was no statute or where the statute left gaps to be filled through
executive implementation." Importantly, Goodnow appeared to include
England within the list of countries in which independent lawmaking by the
executive was allowed, distinguishing it in this fashion from the United
States where the executive "has [only] the right of delegated ordinance[s]."s"
Relatedly, Goodnow alluded to differences between the great degree of de-
tail characteristic of American legislation, and the propensity of English and
especially continental legislatures to confine themselves "to the enactment
of general principles which it is then the duty of the executive, the heads of
executive departments, or the local authorities by ordinance to carry out in
their details." 57
The detailed language and narrow statutory delegations that were the
mark of English legislation subsequent to the Revolution gave way during
the early 19th century to far broader legislative mandates. Crucial to this
transformation was the democratization of the English franchise after the
Reform Act of 1832 and the activist orientation that the British Parliament
came to adopt in the wake of that Act." Writing in 1905, Dicey decried this
development as "The Growth of Collectivism"" and warned against the
dangers of "democratic despotism."60 A decade later, he directly linked
these collectivist tendencies to a "marked decline" in "the ancient venera-
tion for the rule of law" in England.' For Dicey, the connection followed
55. 1 FRANIC J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND,
FRANCE, AND GERMANY 27 (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1893).
56. 2 FRANK J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND,
FRANCE, AND GERMANY 110 (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1893).
57. Id. at 111.
58. Maitland, supra note 37, at 383-84.
59. A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPINION IN
ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 210 (1905).
60. Id. at 304-05.
61. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
xxxviii (8th ed. 1915).
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from an underlying equation between common-law-based conceptions of
the rule of law and limited government.62
World War I accelerated the growth of administrative government in
Britain, and the late-1920s political conflict over the delegation of lawmak-
ing authority to agencies sharpened considerably. A prominent participant
in this debate was Lord Hewart of Bury, England's then-Lord Chief Justice
who published in 1929 a book titled The New Despotism. The title evoked a
comparison between contemporary executive authority and the royal pre-
rogative as it was exercised by the Tudors and Stuarts. Making the compar-
ison explicit, Hewart described pertinent similarities and differences in the
following terms:
In those days the method was to defy Parliament-and it failed. In these days the
method is to cajole, to coerce, and to use Parliament-and it is strangely success-
ful. The old despotism, which was defeated, offered Parliament a challenge. The
new despotism, which is not yet defeated, gives Parliament an anaesthetic. The
strategy is different, but the goal is the same. It is to subordinate Parliament, to
evade the Courts, and to render the will, or the caprice, of the Executive unfettered
and supreme.6 3
The analogy that Hewart drew between royal absolutism and the type
of legislative authority that Parliament conferred on the executive branch
was a recurrent line of attack. Hewart cited in this connection a Times ar-
ticle that likened contemporary legislative trends to the earlier-mentioned
Statute of Proclamations enacted during the reign of Henry VIII." The term
"Henry VIII clauses" soon caught on as a referent to legislative provisions
included in various bills from the 1880s onward that authorized government
departments to make orders modifying the law when found necessary.
These changes were then to be put before Parliament within a short period
of time for authorization. But the requirement for post-hoc parliamentary
authorization did little to allay fears that Parliament would simply rubber
stamp this type of departmental legislation. Moreover, critics perceived the
clauses as means of bypassing judicial review of agency interpretation of
statutes. The "Henry VIII clauses" relieved agencies of the need to frame
their decisions as based on statutory interpretation. Instead, they could ex-
plicitly claim to be changing the law subject to Parliament's approval. Par-
liament, rather than the courts, was made in this fashion the arbiter of the
legality of administrative action. During a time when social legislation
faced significant resistance from judges, ministerial capacity to bypass the
courts in favor of a direct appeal to Parliament held significant benefits for
progressive reformers. Conservatives, on the other hand, denounced what
62. ROBERT THOMAS, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY IN
ADMINISTRATIvE LAw 5-6 (2000).
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they saw as parliamentary capitulation and unconstitutional abrogation of
legislative authority to the executive, akin to that which Parliament dis-
played under Henry VIII.
The controversy prompted the appointment in October 1929 of a
Committee "to consider . . . what safeguards are desirable or necessary to
secure the constitutional principles of the sovereignty of Parliament and the
supremacy of the Law."65 The matter of the "Henry the VIII clauses" was
among the central issues taken up by the report. The compromise position
the report adopted on this matter called for the abandonment of the practice
"in all but the most exceptional cases" and only upon "special grounds
stated in the Ministerial Memorandum attached to the Bill."66 At the same
time, the report concurred with the view that "the Henry VIII clause is a
political instrument which must occasionally be used."6  In similar fashion,
the report left the door open for use of another category of controversial
statutory provisions, which insulated certain regulatory actions from judicial
review. These, like the Henry VIII clauses, were to be used only in "the
most exceptional cases," but the constitutionality of the practice was not
questioned as such. 68
Importantly, in distinguishing between "normal" and "exceptional"
categories of delegated legislation, the report echoed the longstanding Ro-
man law distinction between ordinary and extraordinary law. As dis-
cussed, it was in reference to this distinction and the necessity of emergency
legislative powers that absolutist rulers justified prerogative interventions.
Conversely, the denial of any such extraordinary prerogative authority was a
central tenet of the common law and is at the root of the Diceyian concep-
tion of the rule of law. The degree to which the continental paradigm re-
tained its hold within the English polity at the start of the twentieth century
finds evidence in the report's explicit endorsement of plenary executive
lawmaking authority in matters of emergency. As the report explained:
In a modem State there are many occasions when there is a sudden need of leg-
islative action. For many such needs delegated legislation is the only convenient or
even possible remedy. No doubt, where there is time, on legislative issues of great
magnitude, it is right that Parliament itself should either decide what the broad out-
lines of the legislation shall be, or at least indicate the general scope of the dele-
gated powers which it considers are called for by the occasion.
But emergency and urgency are matters of degree; and the type of need may be
of greater or less national importance. It may be not only prudent but vital for Par-
65. Committee on Ministers' Powers Report. Cmd. 4060, at 1 (1932).
66. Id. at 65.
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69. Id. at 30.
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liament to arm the executive Government in advance with almost plenary power to
meet occasions of emergency, which affect the whole nation ....
The suggested analogy between this type of plenary authority and the
authority that the Henry VIII statute conferred regarding royal proclama-
tions had more than a degree of truth to it. Those who originally coined the
term "Henry VIII clauses" intended it as a political insult grounded in the
assumption that fictions of the type the 1539 statute embodied as means of
reconciling prerogative authority with parliamentary supremacy were inhe-
rently unconstitutional after the 1688 revolution. The extent to which the
term gained hold across all sides in the debate suggests that the compromise
embodied in the Henry VIII clauses remained to some a viable and prefera-
ble alternative to the construction of agency decisionmaking as statutory
interpretation and the judicial oversight that this construction entailed.
IV. AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Almost in parallel with Britain, legislative delegations were at the cen-
ter of a heated legal and political controversy during the 1920s and 30s, one
that was construed to a large extent in reference to the choice between An-
glo-American and continental administrative models. Writing in 1921,
Pound began his book The Spirit of the Common Law with an ode to the
common law's historical resilience throughout repeated crises "in which it
seemed that an alien system might supersede it."" The external threat va-
ried across the centuries and included the Catholic Church, the Tudor and
Stewart rulers of England, and French sympathizers within the early Ameri-
can republic. But the "alien system" in question was always rooted in the
Roman or civil law tradition of continental Europe. For Pound, the early
20th century marked another moment of crisis within this historical chain.
Writing against the backdrop of unprecedented growth in federal and state
administrative power during World War I, Pound argued that
[T]he tendency to commit everything to boards and commissions which proceed
extrajudicially and are expected to be law unto themselves, the breakdown of our
polity of individual initiative in the enforcement of law and substitution of admin-
istrative inspection and supervision, and the failure of the popular feeling for jus-
tice at all events which the common law postulates appear to threaten a complete
change in our attitude toward legal problems.7 2
Five years earlier, in 1916, Elihu Root, who earlier served as Secretary
of State and senator and would later win the Nobel Peace Prize, departed
from Pound's common law sentiments and declared that with the growth of
70. Id. at 52.
71. POUND, supra note 8, at 5.
72. Id. at 7.
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government "the old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power
has virtually retired from the field and given up the fight."73 But the Su-
preme Court would prove Root's prediction wrong when it twice invali-
dated congressional statutes on non-delegation grounds in 1935.74 Writing
in the wake of these decisions, James Landis wistfully noted that "[m]any
administrators who have had to struggle with the problem of translating a
statutory scheme of regulation into a working reality would have welcomed,
at least in a limited form, the power conferred by the so-called Henry VIII
clauses in English legislation."" A grant of power modeled after "[t]hese
celebrated clauses," Landis went on to state, "might prove serviceable as
well as immune from abuse."76 As things stood, however, the option was
foreclosed by the Court's reading of Art. § 1 of the Constitution as barring
Congress from abdicating or transferring "to others, the essential legislative
functions with which it is thus vested."" The equation between administra-
tive decisionmaking and statutory interpretation followed as a consequence.
Following Britain's lead, the American administrative state evolved
over the course of the 19th century through protracted conflict over the legi-
timacy of continental administrative paradigms and the supremacy of com-
mon law principles." And as was the case in Britain, the view of agencies
as interpreters of statutory mandates offered a workable compromise be-
tween those who viewed administrative power as incompatible with com-
mon law constitutionalism and those who argued for the necessity and legi-
timacy of agency autonomy in the modern administrative state. The com-
promise proved resilient largely due to the ambiguous scope of the pertinent
interpretive mandate and the broad range of administrative activities that
could arguably fit under its expansive umbrella. In the process, longstand-
ing divisions over executive lawmaking were recast as administrative law
debates over the degree of deference to be accorded to agency interpreta-
tion. In this way, the current problem definition-"agency interpretation of
statutes"-represents a kind of truce between competing ideologies over the
nature of the American administrative state. Both the fluctuations in admin-
istrative law doctrine and the unresolved search for theoretical principles in
this area stem largely from the ad-hoc nature of this truce.
The relevance of the historical conflict over prerogative lawmaking to
contemporary administrative law has largely receded from view. On occa-
73. Elihu Root, Public Service by the Bar, in ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND
CITIZENSHIP 519, 535 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1916).
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sion, however, these tensions resurface, as in the recent disagreement be-
tween Professors Mashaw and Pierce regarding the existence of a distinct
agency policymaking authority. The competing administrative paradigms at
stake in present discussions of agency statutory interpretation become easier
to recognize when the current controversy is viewed as a modem-day ex-
pression of pervasive and deep historical disagreements over the legitimacy
of executive law making within the common law world.
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